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It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it. 
    --Benjamin Franklin 
 
Reputation is character minus what you’ve been caught doing. 
    --Michael Iapoce 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Reputation is crucial in many arenas, and judging is no exception.  A judge with a 
good reputation will enjoy the esteem of his friends and colleagues and may have chances 
for advancement to higher courts.  If particularly well-known, he or she will have a 
legacy that endures long after death, as do those of Coke, Blackstone and Holmes.  A 
judiciary that operates effectively will earn respect within its own political system and 
internationally, and may become a model for other countries, providing opportunities for 
travel and exchange for judges.  A judiciary with a poor reputation, in contrast, will find 
itself starved of both resources and respect. 
Despite the sense that reputation is important, we know very little about how 
judicial reputation is produced.  We understand that some judges and judiciaries are 
viewed as successful and others are not, but we do not really have any theories about how 
reputation is developed and sustained. In this article, we use economic analysis to provide 
a theory of judicial reputation, and provide preliminary evidence of the institutional 
consequences from a range of legal systems.  
We define reputation in some depth below, treating it as the aggregate of 
judgements used to predict future performance.1
Judicial reputation plays two important roles. First, it conveys information to the 
uninformed general public about the quality of the judiciary (more generally, about the 
legal system) as perceived by the relevant audiences.  Second, reputation fosters esteem 
for the profession and for the individual judge, both self-esteem and esteem in the eyes of 
others.  Esteem of others is a predicate to better payoffs both in terms of material 
resources available to the judiciary as well as insulation from other political actors who 
might expropriate such resources.  We can think of self-esteem as a form of intrinsic 
motivation, and resource-based motives as extrinsic motivation. 
  The object of our analysis is how 
reputation is formed or produced, the mechanisms by which reputation is achieved and 
the institutional incentives that reinforce or harm judicial reputation.  We do not discuss 
whether or not reputation is a good or a bad thing, whether individual reputation is better 
or worse than group reputation, or whether individual visibility and exposition enhances 
creativity and legal change in a more appropriate way than a group-focused professional 
environment. Nor is our analysis normative.  Our concern in this paper is to understand 
how different institutional configurations facilitate different modes of producing 
reputation, with impact on professional norms and the position of judges in society.  
The reputation of the judiciary, individually or as a whole, determines its status in 
any given society and its ability to compete effectively for resources within the 
government. Therefore a reputation for high quality of judicial performance or of the 
legal system in general is important. We do not specify a universal reputation function for 
judges, and recognize that judges in different systems will seek reputations for different 
qualities—such as predictability, wisdom, and efficiency—that might not be valued in 
other systems.   In this sense we treat reputation as instrumental toward some other end 
for which we use the generic term “judicial quality.”   This quality might be assessed 
formalistically (judges should apply and interpret the law correctly according to the will 
of the legislator), authoritatively (judges should be the authority for excellence in 
lawmaking), or from an agency perspective (judges should maximize the welfare of the 
                                                 
1 See below, Sec. I for a more extended discussion. 
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principal, presumably society as a whole). Whatever the definition of judicial quality in a 
particular legal system, reputation emerges as a relevant factor and plays an important 
role. 
 We make three claims.  First, reputation matters. Virtually every theory of judicial 
power is dependent, ultimately, on perceptions of judges, who famously lack the purse or 
the sword.  Only if judges have a reputation for high quality will their decisions be 
respected and produce compliance. Without compliance, judges cannot accomplish their 
social functions of resolving disputes, articulating rules, and serving as vehicles for social 
control.2
 Our second claim is that reputation can be divided into individual and collective 
components.  Individual reputation provides information about individual performance 
whereas collective reputation provides information about the quality of the judiciary in 
general. At the same time, each member of an institution cares about his individual 
reputation, but also about the reputation of the group as a whole (establishing and shaping 
the character, attributes and nature of the group). Collective reputation determines the 
status of the judiciary, but individual reputation influences the judge’s relative perception 
vis-à-vis their fellow judges. Therefore, not all reputation building is necessarily socially 
beneficial; it is possible that some internal status dynamic operates differently than what 
would be socially optimal.   
  Thus, reputation is essential from an instrumental perspective. 
The bifurcated nature of reputation creates interesting institutional challenges, 
which we analyze below using the economic concept of team production.3
 Third, different legal systems configure institutions in different ways in order to 
address the problem of information and reputation. The classical understandings of the 
common law and civil law judiciaries can be seen as sets of linked institutions that are 
mutually supportive in addressing the problem of information and reputation.  We 
describe these institutions from the perspective of information and reputation, and explain 
how they inter-relate.  Judiciaries that emphasize collective reputation utilize institutions 
to limit publicly available information about the performance of the individual judge. 
  If judicial 
performance were essentially individual and the quality of the judiciary could be easily 
disaggregated into the individual contributions, individual reputation should prevail as 
the most important mechanism to provide information. But crucially, it is often difficult 
to monitor separate individual contributions since judicial production entails to some 
extent non-separable elements. Hence, information about aggregate performance of the 
judiciary is also relevant. Consequently, investments into the different components of 
reputation are important to achieve the adequate balance of information required by a 
specific society, and so an important task of institutional design is to provide optimal 
incentives for production of reputation. 
                                                 
2 Shapiro M 1981 Courts, A Comparative and Political Analysis University of Chicago Press; Shapiro, M 
1995 ‘The United States’, in Tate CN and Vallinder T (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power  
making the point that only reputable courts can defend rights from infringements by the majority. 
3 The foundational papers on team production include Alchian AA and Demsetz H 1972 ‘Production, 
Information Costs and Economic Organization’ 62 American Economic Review 777; Holmstrom B 1982 
Moral Hazard in Teams 13 Bell Journal of Economics 324; Aoki M 1994 ‘The Contingent Governance of 
Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarities 35 International Economic Review 657; Rajan RG and 
Zingales L 1998 ‘Power in the Theory of the Firm’ 113 Quarterly Journal of Economics 387. 
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Those that emphasize individual reputation, on the other hand, facilitate the disclosure of 
such information. In both cases the disclosure or non-disclosure of private information 
about individual performance reinforces the kind of reputation that prevails in the judicial 
system.  
 Our discussion of institutional arrangements is fundamentally positive. We 
explain how institutions favor the production of individual and collective information. 
Presumably there is an optimal mix that can vary across jurisdictions depending on local 
preferences, historical events that determine the allocation of human capital, and political 
economy considerations. Although from an economic perspective, we might expect that 
information about individual performance would always be valuable to the relevant 
audiences (other judges, lawyers, economic and political agents, and general public), it 
could well be that the political context makes disclosure of information on individual 
performance harmful. For example, a judiciary that is concerned about threats to its 
independence may prefer to mask individual judicial contributions out of concern that 
politicians may seek to remove judges who decide cases against them. 
 Our effort is consistent with a recent body of work in comparative law that looks 
at the actual institutional structures of different legal systems.4  This approach contrasts 
with the deductive approach that starts with legal origins and assumes that ancient 
institutional distinctions are enduring and consequential.5
 Our article is organized as follows. Part I lays out why reputation matters; Parts II 
and III describes our theory, treating judicial reputation from the perspective of the 
economics of team production. Part IV identifies how particular institutions affect 
reputation, and suggests that institutional configurations fall into two clusters, roughly 
but not exclusively corresponding to the common law and civil law judicial systems.  The 
former system, we find, favors the production of individual reputation and the latter 
collective reputation. Part V suggests lessons for reform. 
  We believe that institutions 
matter, but also emphasize that institutional structures can change over time, and suggest 
that minor institutional reforms can have severe and unintended consequences on the 
production of reputation.  This perspective, we argue, is more helpful to understand 
judicial behavior than the simple categorization of legal origins. 
 
I. WHY REPUTATION MATTERS 
 
To begin, we should define what reputation is with some precision.  As mentioned 
above, we think of reputation of any particular agent as the aggregate of private 
                                                 
4 For a similar approach, see Hadfield G 2008 ‘The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of 
the Quality of Law’ 36 Journal of Comparative Economics 43 ; Hadfield G forthcoming 2009 ‘The Quality 
of Law in Civil Code and Common Law Regimes: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the 
Evolution of Law’ Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization.   
5 The vast literature on legal origins is associated with La Porta R, Lopez de Silanes F, Shleifer A and 
Vishny RW 1998 ‘Law and Finance’ 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 ; La Porta R, Lopez-de-
Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny RW 1997 ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ 52 Journal of 
Finance 1131 ; Djankov S, La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F and Shleifer A 2003 ‘Courts’ 118  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 453; La Porta R, Lopez de Silanes F, Pop-Eleches C and Shleifer A 2004 ‘Judicial 
Balances and Checks’ 112 Journal of Political Economy 445. 
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judgments of past behavior used to predict of future performance.6
In particular, individual reputation conveys information about the individual 
performance of a given judge whereas collective reputation reveals information about the 
general quality of the judiciary. Due to the non-separable nature of judicial production, 
collective reputation is not simply the aggregation of individual reputations. If it were, 
then collective reputation would be trivial. In other words, collective information may 
differ from the sum of assessments about individual performance. Notice that our 
distinction is not merely explained by cognitive limitations, such as the idea that the 
general public cannot recall the individual names of all judges and therefore uses the 
perception of an average performance as a proxy. Our distinction is driven by our 
understanding of judicial production as team work. Judges produce the law collectively 
and so it is difficult to determine whether any individual decision results from qualities of 
the individual judge or the judiciary as a whole. 
    This involves 
information on past performance, as well as signals given by the agent herself.  It is 
possible, but not at all necessary, to imagine that reputation includes an esteem 
component, so that reputation is granted on the basis of some interdependent production 
function by a particular audience.  Assessment of reputation may be based on public 
information or private information, depending who is the relevant audience. 
Judicial reputation matters. It matters from a social welfare perspective because it 
provides information and signals about individual judges and the general quality of the 
judiciary, thus reducing search costs for those who demand court services. Information 
about the judiciary matters for legal certainty, the rule of law, anticipated enforcement of 
property rights, and indirectly for investment and economic growth.  
Judges, like most everyone, care about their reputation to the extent that 
reputation is an important social and economic asset.7
                                                 
6 Miller GD 2003 ‘Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past’ 12 Security 
Studies at 40–78.   
 They care about their monetary 
payoffs, and therefore reputation is important to the extent that those monetary payoffs 
vary with reputation. If information about individual performance determines salaries, 
then judges care about individual reputation. If information about collective performance 
and quality of the judiciary determines salaries, then judges change their behavior 
accordingly.   
7 On judicial individual preferences, see Posner R 1993 ‘What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The 
Same Thing as Everybody Else)’ 3 Supreme Court Economic Review1; Posner R 2005 ‘Judicial Behavior 
and Performance: An Economic Approach’ 32 Florida State University Law Review 1259; Posner R 2006 
‘The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century’ 86 Boston University Law Review 1049 and Posner R 
2008 How Judges Think Harvard University Press.  See also Easterbrook FH ‘What’s So Special About 
Judges?’ 1990 61 University of Colorado Law Review773; Cohen M 1991 ‘Explaining Judicial Behavior or 
What’s “Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing Commission?’ 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 183 ; Cohen M 1996 ‘The Motives for Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Suits’ 12 
International Review of Law and Economics 13; Simon D ‘A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision’ 30 
Rutgers Law Journal 1; Schauer F 2000 ‘Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior’ 68 University of Cincinnati Law Review615; Foxall GR 2004 ‘What Judges Maximize: 
Toward an Economic Psychology of the Judicial Utility Function’ 25 Liverpool Law Review 177; and 
Guthrie C, Rachlinski JJ and Wistrich AJ 2007 ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases’ 93 
Cornell Law Review 1.For a different perspective, see Baum L 1994 ‘What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals 
and Judicial Behavior’ 47 Political Research Quarterly 749 and Baum L 2006 Judges And Their Audiences 
Princeton University Press.  
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But judges also care about nonmonetary payoffs and in this respect reputation is 
an important professional asset. Reputation is defined as a credible signal of high quality, 
which allows judges to fulfill professional duties and achieve career goals.8
Reputation does not matter only for the welfare of an individual judge.  The 
reputation of the judiciary as a whole is dependent on the reputation of its component 
judges.  And the reputation of the courts as a whole is the crucial determinant in the 
judiciary’s ability to accomplish its goals.  Judicial decisions, after all, are not self-
enforcing, and the courts famously lack the power of the purse or sword to implement 
their decisions.
 Individual 
and collective information conveyed to the relevant audience shape the ability of judges 
to influence society. Hence consistency and conformity are important for individual 
judges; following precedents guarantees their ability to shape the law in particular cases. 
9
 There are a variety of theories as to why it is that real world actors obey the 
pronouncements of courts.  One traditional set of arguments focused on the legitimacy of 
judicial decisions. Another set of arguments emphasized enforcement by other state 
officials, but this only begged the question, for one must have an account of why other 
officials have an incentive to obey courts.  A third, increasingly important view sees 
judicial decisions as facilitating coordination of parties’ expectations by providing focal 
points.
  Judicial decisions require real-world institutions to take real actions to 
ensure compliance.   
10
Recently, a former Chief Justice of Israel has explained in detail why individual 
judges care about collective reputation and the extent to which it influences their 
decisions. He identifies collective goals: the judiciary is in his view the “junior partner” 
in the legislative process, in the sense of playing an important role in responsiveness to 
change in social reality within the law; the judiciary is also the “senior partner” in the 
creation and development of the common law, within the powers and limitations of the 
legal system. In order to achieve these goals effectively as a collective, the judiciary 
needs consistency and credibility. In his view even concurring opinions weaken the force 
  In this view, parties obey the judges because they expect other parties to play 
certain strategies in response to the court decision. But regardless of the theory as to why 
judges are obeyed, reputation matters inasmuch the information it conveys is valuable.  A 
better reputation will be correlated with an increased likelihood of compliance, whether 
the mechanism of compliance involved relies on legitimacy, on enforcement, or on 
coordination.  As judicial decisions are complied with, they will provide feedback in the 
form of an improved reputation. 
                                                 
8 For the different possible goals of the judiciary, see Baum L 2004 The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior 
University of Michigan Press and Robbennolt JK, MacCoun RJ and Darley JM, ‘Multiple Constraint 
Satisfaction in Judging’ available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133184.  See also Ran Hirschl, Towards 
Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004) making 
the point that extending the power of the judiciary (juristocracy) as a collective goal can only be achieved 
with certain court reputation, for example, impartial adjudication at the eyes of the public, 
 
9 ‘The Federalist No. 78’ in Wright B ed 1961 at 461. 
10 McAdams R 2005 ‘The Expressive Power of Adjudication’ 2005 University of Illinois Law Review 1043; 
Ginsburg T and McAdams R ‘’ 2004 45 William and Mary Law Review 1229; Law DS 2009 ‘A Theory of 
Judicial Review and Judicial Power’ 97 Georgetown Law Journal 723. 
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of the judgment. But a robust collective reputation allows courts to make flawed 
decisions occasionally since there is confidence in individual and collective 
independence, fairness and impartiality. In sum, individual judges are confronted with 
balancing the benefits of insisting on individual opinions, which may advance their 
personal goals, versus the costs in terms of consistency and credibility, which may create 
uncertainty within the legal system and hurts their prestige and ability to shape the law.11
One can get a sense of how important reputation is by considering the situation of 
judges in some developing countries.  Despite a recent consensus that law plays a crucial 
role in economic development, real-world reforms are difficult to implement, and we 
have little evidence that billions of dollars of investment in improving judicial 
performance has actually paid off.
 
12  In many countries, the judiciary has a reputation for 
corruption.13
Reputation also plays an important role in the recruitment of judges. A more 
reputable judicial system attracts candidates with higher levels of human capital. 
Judiciaries with low reputations or reputations for corruption will attract the ill-qualified 
and greedy.  A lazy judiciary will attract lazy individuals. Even if a system has overcome 
these problems, it is still the case that different reputation mechanisms might attract 
different types of people.
  In these environments, collective action has failed, and individual judges 
seek to maximize their own wealth at the expense of their collective reputation.  It is hard 
to pin ones hopes for reform on institutions that have poor reputations to start out. 
14 Selection processes tend to reinforce the status quo, since the 
new judges are interested in reinforcement of the reputation that attracted them to the 
profession in the first place.15
 In short, we believe that reputation is a central quality of judiciaries that has 
received too little treatment in the literature. Virtually every function for which societies 
rely on the judiciary depends on the production of a reputation for high quality, impartial 
and independent decision-making.  Without reputation, judiciaries are doomed to 
irrelevance. 
 
 
II. A THEORY OF REPUTATION 
 
                                                 
11 See Barak A 2006 The Judge in Democracy Princeton University Press. 
12 Carothers T 2006 Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
13 See, e.g., Buscaglia E 2000 ‘Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic 
Consequences’ Essays in Public Policy Stanford University Hoover Institution Press at 24–29 (; Buscaglia 
E 1997 ‘Judicial Corruption in Latin America’ Essays in Law and Economics Amsterdam Kluwer. 
14 See Malleson K 2004 ‘Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and Human Rights’ in Le Sueur A ed 
2004 Building The Uk’s New Supreme Court: National And Comparative Perspectives Oxford University 
Press (making the point that a career judiciary in common law would create considerable adverse selection 
by attracting less talent since the reputation for judicial independence would be reduced, even if 
recruitment would be more transparent). 
15 For example, if reputation is based on social diversity, judicial professionalism, political ideology, and 
the size of case load, then we should expect judges to promote an agenda that reinforces those factors. See 
Caldeira GA 1983 ‘On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts’ 5 Political Behaviour 83. 
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Reputation can be divided into two components, individual and collective.  Individual 
reputation is related to the name recognition of each judge.16
 Individual reputation-building is fundamentally an activity that each judge must 
accomplish on his or her own, while collective reputation-building is the product of team-
work. Furthermore, it is not always the case that effort allocated to individual reputation 
building enhances collective reputation and vice-versa. In fact, in many circumstances 
these two goals conflict (although in others they do not). For example, individual 
reputation might encourage each judge has to differentiate herself from other judges; 
excessive differentiation across the bench might seriously undermine collective 
reputation.  High variance in the performance of individual judges can hurt the reputation 
of the judiciary as a whole.  
 Collective reputation is 
linked to the role the judiciary is perceived to have in any given society. Each and every 
judge is affected by individual and by collective reputation and consequently cares about 
both. Nevertheless, depending on incentives and the institutional framework, judges 
might be more concerned with one or the other in different societies. 
Judges allocate effort between building individual and collective reputations as a 
response to incentives and the institutional environment. For example, a judge might have 
to decide between advancing his or her own preferences (hence building individual 
reputation for a certain profile) or conforming with the general preferences of his or her 
colleagues (hence promoting collective reputation for consensus). In many 
circumstances, a particular effort can enhance both individual and collective reputation at 
the same time. But in many other circumstances, by investing more in building individual 
reputation, a judge contributes less to building collective reputation. In these 
circumstances each judge has to make a choice as to which type of reputation to invest in. 
Choices are influenced by incentives, which in turn are established by different actors.  
These actors can be considered principals on whose behalf the judiciary works.   
Collective reputation is essentially determined by external mechanisms. It reflects 
the views of society or public opinion in general toward the judiciary, but also by how the 
interests of the relevant particular constituencies with power over the courts are 
addressed.  These constituencies might include the bar, other branches of government, 
political parties and others, depending on the institutional environment of courts. 
Collective reputation shapes the social and political influence of the judiciary as a whole, 
and consequently has monetary and non-monetary implications for the welfare of the 
judges.  For example, collective reputation may impact the overall judicial budget, 
salaries, pensions, and other perks available to the judiciary, as well the level of social 
                                                 
16 Previous work on individual reputation includes Miceli TJ and Cosgel MM 1994 ‘Reputation and 
Judicial Decision-Making’ 23 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 31  (showing that 
individual reputation can both restrain judicial discretion, but also inspire it if future judges are expected to 
be persuaded by a decision and follow it, thereby enhancing the authoring judge's reputation); Harnay S and 
Marciano A 2003 ‘Judicial Conformity versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of Judicial Precedent’ 
2003 23 International Review of Law and Economics 405 (explaining that an individual decision made by a 
judge does not only reflect his personal preferences about a case but also the expected response of the 
judicial community to the decision); Levy G 2005 ‘Careerist Judges’ 36 RAND Journal of Economics 275 
(showing that the possibility of appeal generates an equilibrium where careerist judges tend to be creative 
due to the assumption that contradicting previous decisions is a signal of ability and increases individual 
reputation; at the same time, there is an aversion to reversals because they reduce reputation). 
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prestige and overall working conditions in the courts.  In other words, collective 
reputation determines the size of the pie to be divided among individual judges.  
Individual reputation is established by external mechanisms (such as academic 
commentators, the bar and political actors) but also by internal mechanisms (such as peer 
evaluation by other judges or a judicial council). Individual reputation, as established by 
these internal mechanisms, determines the share each judge gets of the pie while the 
outside appraisal by relevant external constituencies determines potential supplementary 
payoffs obtained individually. The balance between external and internal mechanisms 
shapes individual reputation building.17
In our analysis, we assume that reputation is a noiseless signal of judicial quality, 
however defined. (In information theory, noise refers to distortion in the accuracy of the 
received signal, so that a noiseless signal is one that provides accurateinformation about 
reputation).  Reputation provides information about individual and collective 
performance. Although in the real world, reputations are noisy, we make the simplifying 
assumption that reputation maps accurately onto judicial quality.  This assumption is not 
strictly speaking necessary for our analysis—all we need to assume is that noise does not 
vary systematically across the institutional structures that we analyze.  Nevertheless, we 
set aside noise in the present discussion.  This means we need not consider how 
reputation dissipates after it is acquired.  In the real world, the fact that reputation is noisy 
means that relevant constituencies may continue to accord the judiciary with status, even 
after behavior changes.  Reputations in the real world are sticky, a feature which 
heightens the importance of investing in reputation and makes the problems we discuss 
even more salient.  
 
 
III. JUDICIAL REPUTATION AS A PROBLEM OF TEAM PRODUCTION 
 
The legal system and courts are complex, and the role of judges is multifaceted. In 
theory, one might be able to produce a measure or a set of appropriate measures of 
performance to evaluate the contribution of an individual judge to each case or decision. 
However, when we look at the quality of the legal system as a whole, in terms of uniform 
application and enforcement of the law, conflict resolution, and norm-articulation, the 
marginal contribution of each judge cannot be perfectly determined. In other words, 
measuring individual judicial productivity might be possible in individual cases but from 
an aggregate perspective is quite complicated, due to significant interdependencies in 
production. 
 We can say that the output produced by each judge has an individual component 
reflected in each case decided, and a non-separable component that contributes to the 
overall quality of the court system.18
                                                 
17 For the general public, see for example Caldeira GA 1986 ‘Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Confidence 
in the Supreme Court’ 80 American Political Science Review 1210 and Caldeira GA and Gibson JL 1992 
‘The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court’ 36 American Journal of Political Science 635; for 
administrative bodies and government audiences, see W. N. Eskridge WN 1993 ‘The Judicial Review 
Game’ 88 Northwestern University Law Review 382; Eskridge WN and Ferejohn JA 1992 ‘The Article I, 
Section 7 Game’ 80 Georgetown Law Journal 523; and Ferejohn JA and Weingast BR  1992 ‘A Positive 
Theory of Statutory Interpretation’ 12 International Review of Law and Economics 263; for the larger law 
school audience, see Schauer above note 7. 
 This is neatly captured by Ronald Dworkin in his 
18 The non-separable component is extensively discussed by Barak above n 11.  
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description of judicial production as co-authorship in a chain novel.19 The non-separable 
nature of a portion of judicial output is aggravated by the specific human capital required 
to perform judicial work.20
 As a consequence of the non-separable nature of the output coupled with the need 
for specific human capital, the judiciary operates as a team, and therefore every member 
of the judiciary benefits from a collective reputation. Individual reputation matters to the 
extent that different constituencies look at the individual component of the output. 
Nevertheless, since each judge operates within a court system with a given quality, 
collective reputation necessarily matters as well. The balance between these two will 
depend on institutional attributes and incentives. Significantly, as in any team, 
coordination issues and collective action problems arise. How these problems are 
addressed by a given legal system generates its specific configuration and the balance 
between individual and collective reputation.  
   The characteristics of the job require specific knowledge and 
training in order to achieve the desired understanding of the law. Therefore any 
assessment concerning individual output requires an identical or similar stock of specific 
human capital. The most important beneficiaries of a high quality legal system, the 
general public, lack the knowledge and the sophistication to make such assessment at the 
individual level. Generally speaking, the public is more likely to have an overall 
perception of the court system than a precise assessment of each member of the judiciary. 
Standard economic theory of teams considers two solutions, usually called ex ante 
and ex post sharing rules (both in reference to output production by the team). We 
explain them in the context of the judiciary; ex ante sharing rules correspond to our 
collective reputation model and ex post sharing rules correspond to our individual 
reputation model. 
 
Ex Ante Sharing Rules: Collective Reputation Only 
One solution to problems of team production is to rely on ex ante sharing rules, which in 
our context would mean that each judge earns an equal share of reputation.  This implies 
a judiciary that is reliant solely on collective reputation.  Given the non-separable nature 
of output and the need for specific human capital, collective reputation is necessarily part 
of the payoff function. However, an emphasis on collective reputation only naturally 
raises concerns with shirking, the most common problem with ex ante sharing rules. 
Judges may be driven to reduce their own effort in reputation-building by free-riding on 
their peers. The argument cuts two ways. First, lazy judges will benefit from collective 
reputation and may therefore appropriate surplus reputation for which they did not 
contribute. Second, the costs of undermining reputation are disseminated across the 
judiciary. 
 Another important aspect of ex ante sharing rules that is implicated in an 
emphasis only on collective reputation is that it also generates a collective action problem 
concerning monitoring or coordination mechanisms to reduce the free-riding problem. In 
the absence of specialized actors or an intermediate hierarchy (perhaps in a body such as 
a judicial council) to internalize these coordination issues, individual judges have no 
incentive to unilaterally invest time and resources in detecting lazy judges. Hence, not 
                                                 
19 See Dworkin R 1982 ‘Law as Interpretation’ 60 Texas Law Review 527. 
20 In fact, the non-separable component also includes non-judicial actors such as clerks or lawyers. 
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only does shirking take place, but detection and punishment of shirking is very 
infrequent.     
 Collective reputation only configures a legal system with low powered incentives 
for individual judges. The idea of low powered incentives in the literature on transaction 
cost economics refers to systems of compensation in which individuals do not share in 
the gains from particular transactions, while high powered incentives allow individuals to 
benefit from their marginal contribution.21
  
 In judiciaries without information about 
individual judicial performance, judges can free-ride and shirk. Ex ante sharing rules only 
are thus an insufficient solution to the problem. 
Ex Post Sharing Rules: Individual Reputation Only 
Implementing an institutional design that relies on ex post sharing rules would involve, in 
this context, a judiciary totally reliant on individual reputation. An ex post allocation of 
rewards will likely induce opportunistic rent-seeking, as judges will invest time and effort 
to grab a larger share of resources available to the judiciary and enhance their individual 
reputation. This waste of time and effort is damaging given the partially non-separable 
nature of judicial output. That is, relying only on ex post rewards will induce judges to 
expend more effort on the separable component of output and less effort on the non-
separable components. It seems clear that a judicial system solely based on individual 
reputation could reduce shirking but would become dysfunctional in other ways. 
 This framework may suggest why it is that no judiciary of which we are aware 
seeks to pay judges exclusively at a rate equivalent to their marginal output.  Salaries tend 
to be identical at each level of the judicial hierarchy in all legal systems.  This is not 
simply a matter of administrative convenience, but an implicit recognition that 
differentiated salaries may discourage investment in those activities that tend to 
contribute to collective reputation.22
To provide a concrete illustration, suppose managers of the judicial system 
decided to try to improve efficiency by paying judges on the basis of the number of cases 
they decide.  This could lead judges to seek out the easiest cases, or to spend less time 
deciding any individual case.  While many individual judges would improve their 
reputations for efficiency, the difficult cases would not be handled well, and overall 
quality could decline. This in turn would affect the reputation of the judiciary as a whole.   
 
A legal system that relies on individual reputation only promotes information 
about individual judges and develops collective reputation as a mere aggregation of 
individual reputations. This is a legal system that operates with high powered 
incentives.23
 
 However, due to the nature of team production, high powered incentives 
might be inefficient and reduce the appropriate investment in the non-separable 
component of judicial production. 
Need for Accountability 
                                                 
21 Williamson O 1985 The Economic Institutions of Capitalism Free Press. 
22 We will discuss variable pay for the judiciary in detail in Part V. For example, a notable exception is 
Spain, where variable pay has been introduced in 2003. 
23 See Williamson above n. 21. 
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Either pure mechanism using only ex ante or ex post sharing rules creates serious 
problems. Therefore, a superior approach is to utilize a combination of both ex ante and 
ex post sharing rules, so as to induce production of both collective and individual 
reputation. However, the co-existence of both modes might not be enough to curtail the 
problems of shirking and rent-seeking that we have identified, given the non-separable 
nature of output and the specific human capital inherent to the judiciary. Furthermore, 
external constraints (such as future job opportunities or political interference) might 
shape incentives one way or the other. 
Some palliatives might be necessary to mitigate these problems. In many 
situations, ex ante and ex post sharing rules could conflict in a serious way.   For 
example, sometimes a judge may be able to maximize their own reputation by deciding a 
particular case in a manner that conflicts with the rule of law, harming the reputation of 
the judiciary as a whole.  
 In order to solve these problems and conflicts, we import here the concept of a 
“mediating hierarchy” as developed by Blair and Stout.24
 In our view, a judicial council could play the role of a mediating hierarchy.  
Judicial councils are institutions that have responsibility for selecting, training, and in 
some systems, disciplining judges.
 The essence of a mediating 
hierarchy is that members give up important rights to a third party in a horizontal 
interaction. The quality of the horizontal monitoring depends on evidence, signals and 
susceptibility to group punishment, but it avoids the problem posed by a vertical 
hierarchy, that of curtailing independence of agents. Furthermore, a vertical hierarchy is 
not an ideal solution when individual monitoring is very costly and severe punishment is 
difficult (since individual punishment presupposes separable output). 
25
 A deficient design of a mediating hierarchy can nevertheless lead us to exacerbate 
rather than reduce many of the problems we have identified. Furthermore, there are 
important issues that a mediating hierarchy cannot fully resolve.  One controversial issue 
is the adequate relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government. The 
judicialization of public policies may serve to enhance both collective reputation and 
individual reputation. However, it may unleash countervailing forces that target the 
collective reputation of the judiciary, leading to politicization of the judiciary.  Excessive 
media exposure (a form of accountability) could, for example, make time and effort into 
building individual and collective reputation better applied if judges actively engage in 
judicializing public policies.
  They can help ensure that the judiciary achieves a 
balance between collective and individual reputation through soft policies rather than as a 
full-fledged supervisor. In particular, the judicial council can encourage the development 
of professional norms and, through careful selection processes, team member attributes 
that enhance both the collective and individual reputation of the judiciary.  
26
                                                 
24 See Blair M and Stout LA 1999 ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ 85 Virginia Law Review 
247. 
 Constitutional safeguards against “judicial government” of 
25 Ginsburg T and Garoupa N 2009 ‘Guarding the Guardians? Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence’ 
57American Journal of Comparative Law 103 and Ginsburg T and Garoupa N forthcoming 2009 ‘The 
Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils’ 27  Berkeley Journal of International Law 53. 
26 An immediate question is the extent to which the judiciary should take into account public opinion when 
sentencing. See, for example, Sunstein CR 2007 ‘If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should 
Judges Care?’ 60 Stanford Law Review 155. 
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public policy become then more relevant in order to limit judicial activism. A serious 
political problem may occur when one branch of government (the judiciary or the 
executive) can raise its relative status in the public eyes by lowering the relative status of 
the other branches, necessarily generating important institutional conflicts. 
At the same time, the linkage between reputational incentives and accountability 
also depends on the interaction of other relevant institutional characteristics. For 
example, when the control mechanisms exercised by senior judges weaken, a shift from 
collective to individual reputation building could emerge as the most powerful, if not the 
only available mechanism, to enhance accountability. In other cases, where the judiciary 
is subject to the external influence from multiple sources (for example, the ECJ where 
rewards can come from multiple constituencies such as EU institutions and bodies, 
national governments, national judiciaries), conflictive goals could in fact impede an 
effective mediating hierarchy.  
 A second important issue is known in the economics literature as the relevance of 
team boundaries. It is important for team production that the members of the team, and 
only the members of the team, are responsible for observable output. It could be argued 
that the boundaries of the judiciary are reasonably well-defined and therefore this is not a 
problem in this context. However, the non-separable part of the output (for example, the 
quality of the court system) is also affected by agents who are not members of the 
judiciary and in many circumstances are not even under the control of the judiciary, such 
as clerks, lawyers, and government officials responsible for enforcement. Since the non-
separable part of the judicial output is the determinant of collective reputation, serious 
conflicts are likely to emerge between the mediating hierarchy and other branches or 
bodies of government with respect to control over these other agents. 
 
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
In every legal system, individual and collective judicial reputations and information are 
important. However the relative degree of importance varies not only across legal 
families, but even within the same legal family. If we look at the US federal judiciary, for 
example, individual reputation seems to matter a great deal. The Supreme Court is 
identified with the name of the Chief Justice (such as Warren, Rehnquist or Roberts) and 
the great judges of the past are heroes, such as Marshall, Brandeis, and Holmes.  
Newspapers discuss how individual justices vote in particular cases and quote from 
dissents. Federal judges give talks to the public and write books advancing their views on 
important issues, and the appointment mechanism includes Senate confirmation hearings 
in which individual candidates to the federal courts have to expose their views. 
Academics study the judicial contribution of individual justices in detail,27 and they are 
the subject of popular biographies.28
 In France, Japan and Germany, in contrast, most people have no idea of the 
identity of the Chief Justice, much less the other justices of the Supreme Court; 
newspapers very rarely report on dissenting views across the bench; justices usually 
 There seems to be a significant production of 
individual information and a serious assessment of individual performance.  
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Posner RA 1993 Cardozo: A Study in Reputation University Of Chicago Press . 
28 See, e.g., Foskett K 2005 Judging Thomas: The Life and Times of Clarence Thomas William Morrow. 
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avoid exposure and contact with public opinion in general; and very few judges get to be 
known by the public in general.29  If justice is blind, judges are anonymous. In these legal 
systems, information about individual performance seems to be intentionally 
underplayed, if not systematically hidden from the general public.30
In the United Kingdom, the Law Lords enjoy high levels of prestige but most 
members of the public do not know the names of these twelve people (or even their 
number) except in rare instances when controversial cases draw  media attention (such as 
the Pinochet case in the late 90s).
 
31 Many judges become known by the public only if 
they head specific inquiries into practices or decisions by the government.32
Although the political stakes of the European Court of Justice would seem to 
provide opportunities for individual reputation building, this is another example of a 
court that forcefully pursues collective reputation and avoids any kind of individual focus 
on a single judge. Public unanimity is the norm and there are no dissenting opinions.  
There is a very powerful reason for this. The judges appointed to the European Court of 
Justice defend the need for secrecy and unanimity because their appointments are only 
for six-year renewable terms and not life: if they were to sign separate opinions, member 
states could check whether their judges were voting for or against the national interest 
  
                                                 
29 For example, Sophie Boyron identifies a major concern in France with the “esprit de corps” of the 
judiciary, a professional culture driven by early socialization in the Grande École, then reinforced by 
collective decision-making with a profound distrust for the individual judge and further enhanced by 
judicial trade unions that effectively impose judicial collective bargaining. She also argues that in France 
judicial accountability is collective. See Boyron S 2006 ‘The Independence of the Judiciary: A Question of 
Identity’ in Canivet G, Andenas M and Fairgrieve D eds 2006 Independence, Accountability and the 
Judiciary . Another comparativist, Basil Markesinis, argues that French judges are trained to keep their 
ideas to themselves, see Markesinis BS 1994 ‘A Matter of Style’ 10 The Law Quarterly Review 607. In 
her book, Eva Steiner proposes that the French judiciary is educated and trained as a unit to adhere to a 
collegial form promoted by French courts, see Steiner E 2002 French Legal Method Oxford University 
Press. 
30 See, among others, van Caenegem RC 2002 European Law in the Past and the Future: 
Unity and Diversity over Two Millennia Cambridge University Press  (arguing that, while in 
Britain the bench is paramount and the judges have a highly personal role, in the Continent courts are 
faceless and the judges are described as fungible persons) and Van Caenegem RC 1987 Judges, 
Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History, Cambridge University 
Press (asserting that the legal system is dominated by judges in common and by law professors in civil 
law). A tendency toward bureaucratization seems to be detected in the United States by Fiss O 1983 ‘The 
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary’, 92 Yale Law Journal 1442. 
31 House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Other 
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent)(On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench 
Division); Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others 
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench 
Division) (No. 3), Judgment of 24 March 1999. But some commentators have noted that many people failed 
to understand the role of Lady Thatcher, judging her to be a dissenting minority who voted against the 
extradition of General Pinochet, without being able to distinguish the twelve Law Lords, the other Lords of 
Appeal (currently other thirteen judges) and other members of the House of Lords (including Lady 
Thatcher). See Steyn J 2002 ‘The Case for a Supreme Court’ 118 The Law Quarterly Review 382. 
32 See Garoupa and Ginsburg above note 25, subsection on the UK. See also Penny Darbyshire P ‘Brenda 
and the Law Lords’, mimeograph on file with authors (observing that the Law Lords have been scrutinized 
by academics since the 1960s, yet the media does not seem be interested in their activity). 
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and refuse to reappoint judges who did not vote appropriately, thereby compromising 
their independence.33
 It is clear that in some legal systems collective reputation prevails over individual 
reputation whereas in other legal systems the opposite takes place; some legal systems 
pursue individual performance whereas other prefer to limit information about individual 
performance and rely more on collective assessment.
 This is an excellent example of how provision of individual 
information can be detrimental. 
34
 
 These differences are very 
important at two levels. First, they respond to different incentives and organizational 
attributes within a complex institutional arrangement. Second, they ought to be seriously 
considered in designing legal reforms, especially in an era when most legal systems are 
experiencing increased judicialization of public policies.  This section discusses some of 
the different institutional structures that condition the development of judicial reputation. 
We do not provide a theory of why these institutional structures exist, but rather focus in 
this paper on the contribution of institutional structure to disclosure of information and 
reputation building. For example, we do not discuss the rationale for the existence of an 
appeal system (presumably error correction), but rather examine how the different 
designs of an appeal system enhance individual versus collective reputation or provides 
individual versus collective information. 
A. Career vs. Recognition Judiciary 
One way of contrasting different types of judicial structures is to distinguish the “career” 
from “recognition” judiciaries.35  The career system involves judges entering a judicial 
bureaucracy at a young age, and spending an entire career as a judge.36
 Judicial appointments based on individual recognition typically involve 
appointing a candidate relatively late in life on the basis of a reputation that has already 
been established.  The appointment is based on the individual reputation of the candidate, 
as assessed by the relevant constituency, using an external mechanism outside the 
judiciary. For example, in the United States, the President appoints federal judges, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, after the candidates have developed a stellar 
reputation in other spheres.  The external mechanism helps to compensate for the absence 
  The recognition 
system appoints judges later in life, usually after the candidate has established themselves 
as an excellent candidate. It involves fewer opportunities for promotion. 
                                                 
33 See Rosenfeld M 2004 ‘Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’  4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 618 (contrasting the style and rhetoric of 
the ECJ and the US Supreme Court). Another good case for consideration is the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
34 See Merryman JH and Pérez-Perdomo R 2007 The Civil Law Tradition 3rd edition (observing the 
pressure for consensus in civil law jurisdictions due to legal tradition). See also Merryman JH  1988 ‘How 
Others do It: The French and the German Judiciaries’ 61 Southern California Law Review 1865. 
35 Nicholas Georgakapolous N 2000 ‘Independence in the Career and Recognition Judiciary’ 7 University 
of Chicago Law School Roundtable 205. 
36 For example, the judiciary in the UK has been presented as a career judiciary, where barristers are 
regarded as a first step into the judiciary, in a system more similar to the Continent than to United States. 
See for example, Posner R 1996 Law and Legal Theory in England and the United States Oxford 
University Press(discussing the British career judiciary in chapter 1).  
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of a vertical hierarchy in the judiciary, which decreases the incentives to comply with 
rigid professional norms. Therefore, the appointment system by external agents dilutes 
the collective identity of the judiciary. Finally, the lack of a promotion system seriously 
weakens internal mechanisms of control.  Therefore in recognition judiciaries, individual 
reputation as perceived by external mechanisms is the dominant factor in judicial 
appointments. 
 In contrast, a career judiciary is selected and promoted based on internal judicial 
assessments of individual merit. Relatively little information is available to the public 
about judges, but the judiciary itself develops and uses internal performance measures to 
make promotion decisions. Compliance with internal mechanisms makes collective 
reputation much more important. The credibility of a given judge does not depend on her 
individual merits but on the reputation of the entire judiciary. Serious doubts concerning 
the way judges are promoted, rewarded or disciplined will not primarily hurt any 
particular judge, but the entire profession. Consequently collective reputation building is 
very important for career judges.37
 
 Such systems tend to emphasize the anonymity of the 
law, and the myth that there is a single correct answer for legal questions that in principle 
is invariant to the individual judge making the decision. 
B. Individual Opinions/Dissents/Voting 
The availability of information on the particular judges—be it through the existence of 
individual opinions, the possibility of dissent by judges, or the availability of judicial 
votes in a transparent and verifiable way that is visible to laymen—has two important 
consequences. First, it helps establish an individual reputation for each judge, depending 
on the importance of the opinion, the judge’s vote, the opinion-writer’s creativity, 
innovation and knowledge, and the extent to which she makes a difference in 
jurisprudence.38 Eventually certain judges may be more likely to side with other judges 
who have similar views and interpretations of the law, creating informal coalitions that 
allow outsiders to assign labels to specific judges (as liberal, conservative, libertarian, 
etc.).  Second, individual opinions and dissent help undercut the idea of a homogeneous, 
uniform, bureaucratic, noncritical judiciary. Both aspects favor individual over collective 
reputation building.39 This device is enhanced when the judiciary is faced with big public 
policy decisions that are controversial or at the centre of intense debate across a society, 
such as those involving abortion, gay marriage, segregation, or the welfare state.40
When individual opinions cannot be recorded and dissent is not allowed, the 
judiciary is seen as a homogeneous body, faceless and bureaucratic, in which discussion 
 
                                                 
37 See generally Ramseyer JM and Rasmusen E 2003 Measuring Judicial Independence  University Of 
Chicago Press (focusing on Japan). 
38 See evidence by Taha AE 2004 ‘Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate their Time’ 6 
American Law and Economics Review 1. 
39 See discussion about the quality of opinion writing by Nugent DC 1994 ‘Judicial Bias’ 42 Cleveland 
State Law Review 4 and Miller GP 2004 ‘Bad Judges’ 83 Texas Law Review 431.  
40 For the US, see the evidence provided by Sunstein CR, Schkade D, Ellman LM, and Sawicki A 2006 Are 
Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary Brookings Institution Press (discussing 
these issues in chapter 5).  See generally, Stack KR 1996 ‘Note: The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme 
Court’ 105 Yale Law Journal 2235 and George TE 1998 ‘Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking 
on U.S. Courts of Appeal’ 58 Ohio STate Law Journal 1635. 
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and diversity are replaced with compromise and uniformity.41 The content of decisions 
hurts or enhances the reputation of the judiciary as a whole and not that of a particular 
judge. Peer-pressure becomes dominant since decisions must be reached by consensus, 
resulting eventually in highly complex language to disguise divergences in the bench and 
further reducing the ability of the public to scrutinize opinions. 42
Beyond individual opinions, oral proceedings also offer opportunities for the 
cultivation of individual reputation. Oral proceedings allow judges not only to reveal 
their legal skills, but also their individual positions and make specific contributions to the 
decision taken by the court.  They can also communicate to the specialist audience of 
lawyers, distinguishing themselves from their colleagues.  
 
 Our theory of dissent complements at least one recent account of the practice. In 
tracing the history of opinion practices in common law jurisdictions, Professor Todd 
Henderson argues that opinion practices reflect the desire of courts to expand their role in 
a competitive milieu of norm-articulation.43
 In our view, changes in the overall reputation of the judiciary are the driving force 
in changes in common law opinion practice, rather than political views about the relative 
power of the judiciary per se. Thus, particular problems with individual or collective 
reputation will trigger pressures to move in one direction or the other.  For example, 
Chief Justice Marshall shifted toward unanimous opinions at a time when the status of the 
judiciary was low, in part because seriatim opinions were difficult to understand.  
Centralizing opinion practice enhanced collective reputation, and deviation was explicitly 
  He further argues that those encouraging 
dissent have sometimes wanted to use the presence of multiple opinions as a way of 
constraining the courts, while others have sought to use dissent to advance judicial 
power.   
                                                 
41 For the French case, see Steiner E 2002 French Legal Method Oxford University Press. She traces the 
historical reasons for the inexistence of dissenting opinions and the doctrine supporting such choice. 
Historically, the absence of dissenting opinions is based on the secrecy rules introduced by Philippe VI 
(1328-1350) and Charles VII (1422-1461) to protect judges. This rule was abandoned in 1789 but 
reinstated in 1795. It has now a statutory basis in Art. 448 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 355 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The doctrinal justification is that dissenting opinions are seen as 
undermining legitimacy of the court and the stability of law (since may lead to subsequent changes of the 
case law). 
42Lasser, M. 2004. Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and 
Legitimacy Oxford University Press, makes the point that by signing a decision, the judges assume 
individual responsibility, a principle disliked by the French. Such rejection of individual judicial 
responsibility is embodied by the Law on Judicial Organization from 1790 which restricted the high courts 
(the Parlement) from passing regulations or suspending royal legislation by refusal to record them in the 
official registry (essentially exercising a veto). However, Professor Lasser argues that American legal 
scholarship has misunderstood the bifurcated system existent in France. The idea that French judges have 
no individual responsibility on shaping doctrines and developing law is misplaced. They do, but not 
publically. There is a bifurcation of legal reasoning and policy analysis into two argumentative dimensions: 
the rapports by the reporting judge and the conclusions of the advocate general, on one side, and the 
projets d’arrêt prepared by the reporting judge, on the other side.  
 
43 Henderson MT 2007 ‘From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent’ University of 
Chicago John M. Olin Working Paper No.363. See also Orth J  1994 ‘’ 73 North Carolina Law Review 255 
.  
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discouraged.44 Canon 19 of the ABA's 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics called on judges 
not to “yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than that 
of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in cases of conscientious difference of 
opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of 
last resort.”45 Later, Chief Justice Stone presided over a rapid increase in individual 
opinions, a practice that continues to this day.46  Professor Henderson ties this latter shift 
to the need to maintain power for the court in an era of legal realism, when formalist 
claims to “truth” would not be convincing to relevant audiences.47  Alternatively, one can 
characterize Stone’s encouragement of individual opinions as facilitating investment in 
individual reputation at a time when the court contained a diverse set of personalities and 
had just avoided collective disaster from Roosevelt’s court-packing plan. Those justices 
who fought Roosevelt had put the collective reputation of the entire judiciary at risk; one 
can imagine that afterwards, there would be internal pressures within the court to allow 
segmenting of reputations to individual authors.  This would both ameliorate the new 
minority, who could continue to fight and risk only their individual reputations, but also 
be good for the new majority supportive of Roosevelt, which could avoid negative 
reputational consequences of the minority position.  Our account is consistent with those 
scholars, such as Professors Post and Guinier, who see the shift in Supreme Court opinion 
practices as facilitating new discourses with new audiences.48
 In short, we see the practice of dissent as reflecting alternative institutional 
designs to achieve the goal of reputation.  Individual opinions will be associated with a 
relatively flat organizational structure, in which superior judges have little control over 
inferiors.  Collective opinions will be associated with the suppression of individual 
reputation and the institution of hierarchical controls to overcome collective action 
problems in the production of collective reputation.  Small wonder, then, that judges who 
support the institution of dissent have criticized the alternative model as suppressing 
individual conscience.  Justice William Brennan, for example, critiqued Chief Justice 
Marshall (who strongly pushed for unanimous judicial opinions of the court as a whole) 
as trying to “shut down the marketplace of ideas.”
 
49
In a system that seeks to encourage individual opinions, another possible strategy 
is open to judges.  Judges can write opinions that follow precedent in terms of the 
ultimate decision but seek to develop a new rationale for the decision. In this way, the 
  
                                                 
44 See Fuld SH 1962 ‘The Voices of Dissent’ 62 Columbia Law Review 923 at 928; Post R 2001 ‘The 
Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship and Decisionmaking in the 
Taft Court’ 85 Minnesota Law Review 1267 at 1349–57. 
45 1924 ‘ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics Canon 19’ in Milord LL 1992 The Development of the ABA 
Judicial Code American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility at 137. 
46 Walker T et al 1988 ‘On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme 
Court’ 50 The Journal of Politics 36 
47 See also Post above n 44. 
48 Post above n 44; Guinier L 2008 ‘Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent’ 122 Harvard Law 
Review 4 at 21–23. 
49 Brennan Jr WJ 1986 ‘In Defense of Dissents’ 37 Hastings Law Journal 427 at 438; see also Ginsburg RB 
1992 ‘Speaking in a Judicial Voice’ 67 New York University Law Review 1185 (1992); Ginsburg RB 1990 
‘Remarks on Writing Separately’ 65 Washington Law Review 133. 
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judge can have an impact through their reasoning, even when they decide cases 
consistently with case law. 
  Beyond the possibility of individual opinions, the legal impact of decisions is also 
relevant.  In the United States, precedent from a higher court generally controls lower 
courts, and this provides an incentive for higher court judges to issue clear, well reasoned 
decisions that induce lower courts to comply.  Within lower courts, however, precedents 
do not control.  For example, in the United States, federal district court opinions do not 
count as precedent within the same district.  An individual federal district court judge 
need not follow the legal holding of a prior decision in the same district. This device 
seems to encourage experimentation in lower courts, and to reward investment in  
individual reputation at the expense of collective reputation at the lower court level.  At 
the same time, the requirement of following superior court precedents means that the 
costs to the collective reputation of the judiciary as a whole can be contained.  The U.S. 
system thus favors individual reputation, with some offsetting devices to ensure some 
collective consistency. 
 
 
C. Sentencing and Procedural Discretion 
Discretion in criminal sentencing and in procedural rulings favors individual reputation 
over collective reputation by providing yet another way for judges to distinguish 
themselves from each other.50
                                                 
50 On how judges use discretion in civil procedure to favor their own goals, see Macey JR 1994 ‘Judicial 
Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure’ 23 Journal  of Legal Studies 627 (1994) and 
Alexander JC 1994 ‘Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey’ 23 Journal of Legal 
Studies 647.  
 Reduced discretion in sentencing and in procedure favors 
homogeneity across the bench.  There are two relevant consequences of this observation. 
First, differences in sentencing or in procedure could be exacerbated by judges who are 
purely interested in individual reputation building.  In other words, the variance in 
sentencing or in applying procedural rules could increase significantly if judges focus on 
individual rather than collective reputation.  Second, if the degree of discretion is higher 
with procedure than with substantive sentencing, judges could be tempted to use 
procedure to build individual reputation and therefore effectively curtail sentencing rules 
or guidelines (e.g., use evidence and other related procedural rules to bias the court one 
way or the other). Strict sentencing rules could have very different consequences in a 
system in which collective reputation prevails, where such rules would enhance 
uniformity and hence reinforce collective reputation, as opposed to a system where 
individual reputation is important.  In the latter, strict sentencing guidelines might be 
undermined by procedural discretion since they limit the ability for individual judges to 
be distinct.  This account sheds some light on judicial resistance to sentencing guidelines 
in the United States.  Judges are embedded in a set of structures that encourage 
investment in individual reputation.  Efforts to constrain their ability to do so, unless 
accompanied by much broader institutional reforms, are likely to fail and lead to new 
arenas in which judges seek individual reputation. 
Garoupa and Ginsburg, Reputation p. 20 
 
 
 In some sense this discussion raises broader themes in legal scholarship of the 
distinction between rules and standards.51
 
  Rules, it is often argued, are useful for 
constraining the discretion of individual judges, but are expensive to produce at a 
sufficient level of detail. In addition, rules can be over- and under-inclusive, subsuming 
within their ambit behavior not intended to be covered by the norm. Standards, on the 
other hand, empower the individual judicial decision-maker at the expense of uniformity.  
We should expect that the institutional structure of the judiciary will tend to favor rules 
when collective reputation is valuable, and standards when individual reputation is 
valuable.   
D. Appeals 
The appeal system and the nature of the relationship between superior and inferior courts 
play an important role in shaping incentives to invest in individual versus collective 
reputation building. A generous appeal system that essentially allows superior courts to 
review and evaluate the decisions taken by inferior courts induces compliance by junior 
judges and favor homogeneity and uniformity in decision-making.52
 A crucial dimension on which appeals systems differ is the question of de novo 
review.  In common law jurisdictions, appeals courts generally only hear questions of 
law, leaving the factual record to be developed at the trial level.  This is often explained 
as originating in the institution of the jury, which finds facts and would have to be 
reconvened or reproduced to have de novo review. In contrast, civil law jurisdictions 
have de novo review of facts at the higher levels.  This involves replication, but also 
allows fuller monitoring of junior instances to ensure quality.  Our interpretation is that 
de novo review is a device to ensure collective reputation, while the lack of such review 
encourages individual judges to develop novel interpretations of law and to use their fact-
finding power toward reputational development. 
 An appeal system 
that imposes few constraints on junior judges gives them more discretion and naturally 
generates more heterogeneity in sentencing which favors individual reputation. At the 
same time, an appeal system that permits conflicts of jurisdiction and law across courts, 
such as the American system which allows for the possibility of circuit splits, disfavors 
collective reputation and pushes toward investment in individual reputation. An appeal 
system that effectively internalizes potential conflicts and therefore reduces discrepancies 
in courts’ decisions contributes decisively to collective reputation.  
 
E. Citations 
The use of citations in decisions reflects the importance of individual opinions, and hence 
generally contributes to enhancing individual reputation.53
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Schauer F 2005 Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes Belknap Press ; Sullivan KM 1992 ‘The 
Supreme Court, 1991 Term--Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards’ 106 Harvard Law Review 22; 
Kaplow L ‘Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ 42 Duke Law Journal 557 at 561–62. 
 Citations presuppose that 
52 Shavell S 1995 ‘The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction’ 24 Journal of Legal Studies 379. 
53 See Choi S and Gulati M 2007 ‘Ranking Judges According To Citation Bias (As A Means To Reduce 
Bias)’ 82 Notre Dame Law Review 1279; see also Posner R 2000 ‘An Economic Analysis of the Use of 
Citations in the Law’ 2 American Law and Economics Review 381; Landes WM, Lawrence Lessig L and 
Solimine ME 1998 ‘Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges’ 27 
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some cases and court decisions are path-breaking, not just because the object of the 
action is extremely relevant, but because the doctrine and legal interpretation offered by a 
given judge is worthy of consideration. Controversial decisions attract attention and 
generate debate even when they are not good law. Obviously this means that individual 
judges can seek to be identified for a famous case or a notorious decision. The 
widespread use of citations clearly favors individual reputation building, particularly 
when combined with the institution of individual named opinions.  
 
F. Case Selection 
The degree to which the judiciary controls the dockets of courts plays an important role 
in the process of establishing reputation.54  The control of dockets can operate at the 
micro level, that is, in choosing particular cases, and at the macro level through such 
devices as justiciability doctrines that narrow or expand the scope of judicial review. 
When judges cannot effectively influence the cases they hear, collective reputation 
operates as a type of insurance, since some judges will randomly be assigned cases that 
are more suited for enhancing individual reputation than others through a mechanism that 
does not take into account different skill levels across the bench.55
 
 In other words, 
collective reputation reduces the potential reputational damage from being assigned cases 
that are detrimental to a particular judge in terms of preferences or skills. When dockets 
are effectively controlled by the judiciary itself, case assignment is not longer truly 
random. Individual reputation becomes an asset in such a system in two complementary 
ways. First, reputation allows individual judges to become favored in the distribution of 
cases to be reviewed by the courts relative to other colleagues. Second, reputation allows 
further enhancement of individual reputation, by allowing judges to pick cases that are 
more appropriate for the relevant constituencies. Case selection is a strategic variable in 
preparing the setting for reputation building.  
G. Branding 
A legal system that allows judges to attach their names to opinions, doctrines, 
extrajudicial inquiries, and law reform projects obviously places great value on individual 
reputation. For example, in the United Kingdom, judges are frequently called upon to 
lead inquiries into government behavior.56
 Branding also extends to private sector opportunities after retirement, including 
corporate advisory positions, participation in politics, teaching and prestigious 
conferences. Clearly individual reputation is more important than collective reputation 
 A legal system in which law reforms are 
conducted by bureaucrats and law professors, quasi-judicial inquiries are led by 
government officials, and doctrines are developed by law professors does not provide 
significant incentives for judges to invest in their individual reputation.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Legal Studies 271, and Choi S and Gulati M 2004 ‘A Tournament of Judges?’ 92 California 
Law Review 299. 
54 See, among others, Jacobi T 2008 ‘The Judicial Signaling Game; How Judges Shape their Dockets’ 16 
Supreme Court Economic Review 1. 
55 That is, “better” judges do not get “better” cases whatever “better” might mean in this context. 
56 King A2007 The British Constitution Oxford University Press at 135. 
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for private sector opportunities after retirement, although a collective reputation for 
honesty and transparency could be beneficial from this point of view. 
 A third important component of branding is a legacy, broadly defined.  For 
example, judges may be concerned with how they will be cited and discussed in 
casebooks, and how their decisions will be vindicated by future generations of judges. 
Concern for legacy motivates investment in individual reputation of particular judges, 
and less so on the collective reputation of the entire judiciary. 
 
H. Size 
The size of the judiciary is important in structuring incentives to invest in reputation. A 
larger judiciary raises the cost for each judge to engage in individual reputation building 
because there is more competition, and decreases the cost for each judge to engage in 
collective reputation building, since the effort required of any individual judge will be 
smaller. In a supreme court with nine justices, the actions of a single individual are easily 
monitored and assessed by the media in general.  In a supreme court of seventy-five 
justices, as is not uncommon in the civil law world, only experts can assess the actions of 
individual judges, and effective monitoring is limited to other judges or the members of 
the high judicial council. Therefore a small judiciary generates investment in individual 
reputation and recognition; larger numbers induce uniformity and investment in 
collective reputation.  
 Larger judiciaries also affect incentives in another way: through providing 
opportunities for advancement and promotion.  If there are relatively few opportunities 
for promotion, judges will be less sensitive to pressures from higher levels of the 
hierarchy.  They may therefore be less willing to sacrifice elements of individual 
reputation for the collectivity.  In contrast, in a large bureaucratic judiciary, there are 
significant opportunities for advancement and judges will be sensitive to the concerns of 
their superiors.57
 
  This design tends to suppress individual variance and lead to greater 
investments in collective reputation. 
I. Budget and Allocation of Resources 
Judges are also the managers of the legal system under very different institutional 
arrangements. Management requires resources and a budget. These resources have to be 
negotiated with the government, since tax revenues are collected by the government. 
Courts may have their own resources from legal fees and other financial instruments, but 
these do not typically account for a significant proportion of revenues for the judicial 
system.  The dependence on the government for resources creates a need for bargaining 
with the government, as well as bargaining within the court system for shares of overall 
resources. 
 If resources and the budget, in particular, are allocated to judges as individuals 
then individual reputation becomes a major asset in bargaining over resources within the 
court system. However, if resources are allocated in a manner that is administratively and 
independently of the individual judge, collective reputation becomes a major variable 
since only through collective reputation can the judiciary obtain more resources from the 
government. As mentioned before, the practice of identical pay for judges of a similar 
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rank can be viewed as a device to encourage investment in collective over individual 
reputation. 
 
J. Other Mechanisms 
Other mechanisms that incentivize individual comparisons of judges are elections to 
select judges and forum shopping.  In judicial elections, each candidate has to present a 
distinctive platform to convince the electorate to vote for him or her, heightening 
incentives to disassociate the judge from collective reputation, and to brand decisions 
with his or her personal stamp.58 Forum shopping is more complicated, because it 
involves the need for a particular court as a whole to associate itself with particular 
doctrinal or procedural positions to attract litigants.59
 
  This requires some investment 
collective reputation, but only for the court rather than the judiciary as a whole.  The 
competition for cases should produce greater variance in decisions across courts, 
especially to the extent that the Supreme Court also induces courts. Panels in lower 
courts, on the other hand, tend to reduce the possibility of individual evaluation of judges 
and so complicate the development of individual reputation. 
K. The Interdependence of Institutional Choices 
The above institutions are conceptually distinct from each other.  Crucially, however, 
they are reinforcing in terms of reputation and provision of information about 
performance.  The common law tendency toward a “recognition” judiciary is based on 
judges who are selected because their earlier investments in reputation allow ex ante 
screening for quality and effort.  Such judges can be trusted to write high quality 
individual opinions. In contrast, the “career” system associated with the civil law hires 
judges at a young age, and therefore cannot trust them to adequately invest in individual 
reputation without extensive monitoring.  Hence we see collective opinions. Citations are 
also less important, as the identity of any individual judge is usually not known.  
Branding is frowned upon. 
 The career system also requires many more judges, because monitoring output at 
the lowest level requires an intermediate supervisory level (itself an autonomous body or 
a different layer of a more hierarchical court system). Appeal is essential to maintain 
quality and discourage shirking. Appeals are de novo, in order to ensure that individual 
judges do not harm the collective reputation of the judiciary. We thus observe much 
larger judiciaries to accomplish de novo review.  This reinforces the notion of team rather 
than individual production, and reduces the amount of effort required by any single judge 
to produce reputation. 
 We also see differences in the discretion over dockets in the two systems.  The 
judges in recognition systems have a variety of devices to exercise docket control, 
                                                 
58 On judicial elections, see, e.g., Webster P 1995 ‘Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There one Best 
Method?’  23 Florida State University Law Review 1 ; Hanssen FA  2004 ‘Learning About Judicial 
Independence: Institutional Change in State Courts’ 33 Journal of Legal Studies 431 at 462; Epstein L, 
Knight J and Shvestova O 2002 ‘Selecting Selection Systems’ in Burbank SB and Friedman B eds 2002 
Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach Sage Publications, Inc  at 191–
226 (S. 
59 See generally Klerman D 2007 ‘Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law’ 74 
University of Chicago Law Review 1179 at 1188 .  
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particularly at the senior levels.  This allows them to control their policy-making role.  In 
contrast, career judges are viewed as relatively low level functionaries without individual 
discretion. 
 It is interesting to think about the ideology of the common law and civil law as 
reinforcing these institutional features.  It is generally understood that the civil law 
tradition conceives of “the law” as a unified coherent whole, with pre-existing answers to 
legal questions that are identifiable through the exercise of legal science.60
 
  This idea de-
emphasizes the role of the individual judge in crafting the law, and in principle different 
judges are not thought to be able to arrive at different answers to legal questions.  In 
contrast, common law judiciaries tend to see law as more akin to policy.  Policy matters 
are those which in principle reasonable minds can disagree.  This is not to suggest that 
law is infinitely plastic, but rather that for hard legal questions (of the type most likely to 
be litigated) different judges may come up with different answers.   Seeing law as policy 
means that we need to identify the particular reasoning and to associate it with an 
individual judge.  These different conceptions of the law obviously track the distinction 
between collective and individual reputation. 
 V. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
 
 By way of illustration, contrast the U.S. Federal judiciary with that of Japan.  We 
take these two countries to represent ideal-typical poles in the organization of judiciaries, 
and hence use them to illustrate the argument.61
 Individual judges have a good deal of discretion. At the trial level, 
notwithstanding efforts to develop sentencing guidelines, judges retain a good deal of 
control over the procedure.  The appellate system is limited to questions of law, meaning 
that the system tolerates a good deal of diversity both across first-instance courts and 
across regions of the country.  Lawyers, of course, know this, and so sometimes seek to 
forum shop to obtain a favorable venue; less formally, most lawyers will have strong 
views about the character of individual justices at the appellate level. 
 The United States is a classic example of 
a “recognition” judiciary, in which judges are appointed to the bench in large part 
because of individual accomplishments in other spheres. They are known as superior 
individuals who have already developed a certain amount of reputation; indeed, the 
collective reputation of the judiciary may in part derive from achievements in other 
spheres.  An extreme case was former President Taft, who subsequently became Chief 
Justice.  Individual judges in the United States sit alone at trial level, and do not move 
courts, unless they are lucky enough to be appointed to a higher level.  At the appellate 
level judges frequently write their own dissenting and concurring opinions.  A vigorous 
citation practice encourages this individuation of opinions. 
 The limited appellate system means that a relatively small judiciary is tolerable. 
The United States has one of the lowest ratios of judges to lawyers in the world.62
                                                 
60 Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo above n 34. 
  This 
in turn enhances the prestige of those lawyers who actually do make it onto the bench.  
61 More examples are discussed in detail by Garoupa N and Ginsburg T 2009 ‘Judicial Reputation and 
Audiences: Perspectives from Comparative Law’, 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 451. 
62 See Posner above n 36.  
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Judges are generalist wise men and women, and many of them develop a reputation as 
judicial statesmen or public intellectuals. Supreme Court cases are routinely front-page 
news, and scrutinized by the chattering classes for their public policy implications.  Many 
judges become heroes, and their names live on in history. This is a system that greatly 
values individual reputation. 
Contrast all this with the Japanese judiciary.  Japanese judges enter the judiciary 
at a young age and spend their career in a hierarchical structure.  They will spend their 
career in a series of two- and three-year rotations, moving around the country and so 
unable to be identified with any particular court location.63 Opinions are unsigned at all 
levels save the Supreme Court and dissenting opinions are rare. Japanese Supreme Court 
decisions are rarely front page news, and even many lawyers cannot name the justices of 
the Court.  Decisions at the lower level are unsigned and so the judge is essentially 
faceless, reflecting the civil law ideology that the decision reflects the law rather than 
views of any particular judge.  The judiciary as a whole has a reputation for quality and 
predictability, but individual judges have no reputation at all.64
The ideology of judging is such that judges are seen as having no independent 
influence on case outcomes, and there is a theoretical correct answer for every case. 
Indeed, in some cases the judge will be replaced because of the rotation system, with no 
concern for problems that may cause.
  
65  There are also internal systems for uniformity, 
including tables of formulae for damage awards, so that like cases will be treated alike 
regardless of the judge hearing the case.  The rotation system also provides for 
suppression of discretion: judges who are outliers can and will suffer in terms of being 
assigned to undesirable locations.66
A major scholarly debate concerns whether or not the Japanese judiciary is 
independent.
 This can be seen as a device for ensuring that 
individuals contribute to collective reputation, and that an overall reputation for 
uniformity is maintained. 
67  Professor Ramseyer and co-authors have emphasized the ability of the 
Supreme Court Secretariat to discipline judges at lower levels.  Because the Secretariat is 
appointed by the Supreme Court itself, the Supreme Court is appointed by the Diet, and 
the Diet has been controlled by a single political party for most of the last six decades, 
Ramseyer argues that judges are ultimately subject to external control.68
                                                 
63 Ramseyer and Rasmusen above n 37. 
   He provides 
evidence that judges who ruled against the interests of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
64 Haley J ‘The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust’ Lectures and 
Occasional Papers, Whitney R. Harris Institute for Legal Studies, No. 3. Washington University School of 
Law available at http://law.wustl.edu/igls/lecturespapers/2003-3haleyjapanesejudiciary.html 
65 Haley J 1990 Authority Without Power Oxford University Press. 
66 Ramseyer and Rasmusen Measuring above n 37. 
67 Upham F 2005 ‘Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary’ 30 
Law and Social Inquiry 421. 
68 Ramseyer and Rasmusen above n 37; Ramseyer JM and Rasmusen EB 2001 ‘Why Are Japanese Judges 
So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?’ 95 American Political Science Review 331;  V  JM and  
Rosenbluth FM 1993 Japan’s Political Marketplace Harvard University Press  at 178; see also Law DS  
2009 ‘The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan’ 87 Texas Law Review 1545 (2009). 
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Party have suffered career sanction.  This account emphasizes a particular external 
audience for the courts that operates at the individual level. 
Professor Haley, by contrast, emphasizes the internal audience and the collective 
quality of the judiciary.69
Our concern is not with independence per se.  Much of the debate between Haley 
and Ramseyer turns on one’s conception of judicial independence and whether it inheres 
in the individual judge or the judiciary as a whole. From our perspective, the key question 
is what audience the judiciary is addressing in its decision-making.  Even if Professor 
Ramseyer is correct (and we find his evidence convincing) it does not explain judicial 
decision-making in the vast majority of cases which have low political salience.  For 
these cases, internal audiences are indeed the most important.  Certainly, when compared 
with a judiciary such as that of the United States, Japan’s institutional structures lean 
heavily toward collective reputation. 
 Japanese judges work in a hierarchy that is similar to that of 
other large Japanese organizations, in which one enters the organization at a young age 
and spends ones whole career in the same institution.  For all large organizations, internal 
controls help to socialize staff. The emphasis is on mechanisms of collective reputation, 
in which Japanese judges are evaluated by society only on a collective basis.  Haley 
points to the relative rarity of sanctions, the complete absence of reported instances of 
judicial corruption, and strong corporate identity of the judiciary to argue that the 
Japanese judiciary is indeed quite independent. 
This situation has begun to change slightly.  In the late 1990s, after several years 
of economic malaise, Japan’s elites initiated a major program of legal reform, 
culminating in the creation of a Justice System Reform Council in 1999. The Council 
issued its report two years later and was quite critical of the judiciary for maintaining a 
detached stance toward society, and being insufficiently transparent.70  It called for 
increasing the number of appointments from the ranks of practicing lawyers. Though the 
number of such appointees remains low so far, this has the potential to introduce new 
incentives for judges to focus on the legal profession as a relevant audience. Another 
recommendation focused on allowing citizens some role in the reappointment of judges. 
This is required for Supreme Court justices every ten years under Japan’s Constitution, 
though in practice this is never utilized because judges are appointed to the Supreme 
Court relatively close to the retirement age.71
                                                 
69 Haley JO 2007 ‘The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust’ in Foote 
DH ed 2007 Law in Japan: A Turning Point University of Washington Press at 99, 109 () ; see also 
O’Brien DM and Ohkoshi Y 2001 ‘Stifling Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary’ in 
Russell PH and O’Brien DM eds 2001 Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical 
Perspectives from around the World University of Virginia Press 37, at 59. 
  In 2003, an eleven-member Advisory 
Committee for the Nomination of Judges was established, five of whom are “insiders” 
(judges, prosecutors or lawyers) and the remaining six from academia and the general 
70 Justice System Reform Council 2001Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For a 
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century. 
71 Constitution of Japan, Art. 79(2) (“The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be 
reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following 
their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of 
Representatives after a lapse of ten years, and in the same manner thereafter.”).  
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publlc.  The Committee has already rejected some propoed candidates on the basis of its 
own investigations.72
Perhaps even more radically, the JSRC recommended the introduction of a quasi-
jury system, in which citizens will sit in a mixed panel with judges in serious criminal 
cases.  This reform, while not demanded by the public, was seen as an important step 
toward improving the transparency and legitimacy of the justice sytem as a whole.  As a 
result, from August of 2009, ordinary citizens began to sit as saiban-in, lay decision-
makers, deciding serious criminal cases.
 
73
 
  One can view this development as seeking to 
force the judiciary to make its decisions more transparent to the ordinary citizen, 
reflecting a shift from internal toward external audiences for judges.  One also observes 
increased coverage of legal cases in newspapers, and even criticism of some decisions in 
public.  Still, the core institutions of the career judiciary have remained in place, and the 
shift is only a matter of degree.  
VI. DISCUSSION: LESSONS FOR REFORM  
 
Our basic argument is that institutional structures will incentivize investment in either 
individual or collective reputation in different degrees.  These incentives respond to the 
needs for individual and collective performance information as perceived in each legal 
system. An ideal structure will provide sufficient incentives to invest in both individual 
and collective reputation, and we believe that systems that stray too far in one direction 
will not be able to deliver efficient, neutral justice. In fact, when too little of one type of 
information is provided or made available, legal reforms might try to provide incentives 
to reverse the situation. 
This argument has implications for judicial reform programs. Above all, our 
analysis suggests caution in introducing reforms, as the linked nature of many institutions 
that affect reputation mean that change in one can have unanticipated effects in other 
institutions. Still some reforms might be feasible and appropriate.  We consider first 
proposed reforms that are designed to induce more investment in individual reputation 
and then reforms designed to enhance collective reputation.   
 
A. Reforms to Induce Greater Individual Effort 
1. Variable Pay 
We wonder if there might not be greater scope for introducing variable 
compensation for judges based on performance.  In an ideal world, we would compensate 
judges for their marginal contribution to judicial reputation, which would require some 
proxy for individual judicial performance. There are however three substantive problems 
that need to be considered, some of them already detected in Part III. First, individual 
performance measures might disrupt team work and raise agency costs, that is, given the 
existence of a non-separable component, it might not be possible to approximate the 
                                                 
72 Rokumoto K 2007 ‘Judicial Reform in Japan’  in Choi D and Rokumoto K  2007 Justice System in 
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individual marginal contribution. Second, inadequate individual performance measures 
might distort activities, hence generating strategic adjustments by the judiciary in order to 
boost the potential gains. For example, we might see judges invest insufficient time in 
hard cases, or seek to hear only easy ones. Finally, there might be a crowding-out effect 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Many professional norms among the judiciary 
(regarding, for example, judiciousness and precedent) are established by prestige and 
status, and they could be undermined by the introduction of high powered market 
incentives that result in differential pay.74
Fee for service has some history in the common law. Until 1799, judges in the 
English monarchical courts were paid a salary and also were allowed to charge fees that 
ranged from 8 to over 54% of total judicial income. 
  
75 Professor Klerman has argued that 
these fee for service arrangements facilitated competition among judges and among 
courts to produce quality rules, particularly those that favored plaintiffs.76  There is some 
evidence that courts with institutional structures that concentrated authority were better 
able to produce innovative rules in this process of competition.77
The system, however, was controversial in the United States.
 The English system thus 
seems to have provided some incentive for both individual and collective reputation. 
78  Though fee for 
service arrangements were common in colonial America, there was concern about the 
potential for judicial corruption and many state constitutions banned the practice.79  
Article III of the U.S. Constitution seems to frown upon, and probably ban, the practice 
for federal judges, referring as it does to payment for services “at stated Times.”80 The 
Judiciary Act provides for salaries rather than fees, and when one early district court 
judge insisted on charging fees for admiralty cases, the Congress responded by 
forbidding the practice.81
The only such modern effort of which we are aware was in Spain.  A 
controversial law allowed for the possibility of performance based salaries for the 
 In short, the US experience has shied away from fees for 
ordinary judges. Specialized courts and some lower level magistrates, however, have 
received variable pay.  For example, bankruptcy judges were paid by size of case till 
1890s. 
                                                 
74 The crowding-out effect is well-known in the economic literature. See, among others, Frey B and  
Neckermann S 2008 ‘Awards: A View from Psychological Economics’ Working-Paper 357 Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich and McAdams R and Rasmusen E 2007 ‘Norms in 
Law and Economics’ in Polinsky AM and Shavell S eds 2007 Handbook of Law and Economics North 
Holland.  
75 Klerman D 2007 ‘Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law’ 74 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1179 at 1188 ; Aylmer GE 1974 The King’s Servants:  The Civil Service of Charles I, 
1625-1642 Columbia University Press revised edition; Aylmer GE 1973The State’s Servants:  The Civil 
Service of the English Republic, 1649-1660 Routledge and Kegan Paul Books . 
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid at 1217 
78 Pfander JE 2008 ‘Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic’ 105 
Michigan Law Review 1.  
79 Ibid at 3. Pfander notes that other states allowed payment of fees into the 19th century. 
80 Ibid at 12-15. 
81 Ibid at 22. 
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judiciary (Ley 15/2003). The judicial council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) 
implemented that new system of compensation in 2004 (Reglamento 2/2003) but the 
Spanish Supreme Court nullified it in March of 2006 (Sentencia de la Sala de lo 
Contencioso Administrativo 17/2004). Aside from procedural issues, the substantive 
arguments provided by the Supreme Court included that the estimation of individual 
productivity is contrary to the very nature of judicial activity and the work of the 
judiciary is not compatible with quantitative assessments of productivity.  We view this 
decision as privileging collective reputation over individual reputation.82
Presumably, in theory, adequate performance measures should be able to avoid all 
these shortcomings (minimizing the costs of disrupting team work, deterring strategic 
inefficient substitution of activities, and avoiding crowding-out effects with intrinsic 
motivation), but it might be unfeasible for practical purposes to develop such measures. 
Furthermore, the most obvious performance measures as embraced by the Spanish legal 
policymakers are likely to be insufficient and even detrimental.  Compensation based on 
the number of cases or the speed of case disposition is likely to induce judges to spend 
too little time on cases, and to seek to avoid complex cases.  Using productivity in terms 
of the number of pages drafted is likely to lead to wordy opinions that are too long.  In 
conclusion, although ideal individual performance measures would be the optimal 
instrument to improve individual reputation from an economic perspective, we are quite 
skeptical that such devices can be utilized effectively. Still, we encourage scholars to 
consider workable proxies for judicial performance that might facilitate the creation of 
new incentive structures for judiciaries.
 
83
 
 
2 .Transparency 
Another reform that may be workable is to introduce transparency into the 
operations of the judiciary.  Simply informing the public of the judges who sit in a 
particular case will induce marginal investment into individual reputation while 
encouraging accountability. Currently, information is hard to come by, particularly in 
many developing countries.  Judicial councils and ministries of justice provide 
information in some systems.  
One idea here is to encourage competing sources of information.  There would be 
some cost in terms of duplication but there may also be corresponding benefits in 
accuracy.  In many developing countries, non-governmental “judicial watch” programs 
have been established, often with the help of foreign donors.  The thought is that the 
judiciary, like any other administrative agent, requires monitoring.  Because of concerns 
about judicial independence, hiring another state agency to watch the courts seems 
inappropriate and so civil society can play a role in watching individual cases (as can the 
                                                 
82 Details can be found in Contini F and Mohr R 2007 ‘Reconciling Independence and Accountability in 
Judicial Systems’ 3 Utrecht Law Review 26. A background on the Spanish judiciary and the transition from 
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and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis’ 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 
605. 
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media.)  If working well, this tends to enhance investment in both individual and 
collective reputation. 
Forum-shopping could be another interesting way to pursue individual reputation. 
It naturally introduces competition among courts which puts pressure on judges to build 
individual reputation in order to attract litigants. 
 
B. Reforms to Induce Greater Collective Effort 
Unlike individual reputation, investment in collective reputation requires 
collective action on the part of the judiciary as a whole.  When senior judges have a 
supervisory role, they may be the focus of reform efforts.  How might the senior 
managers of the judiciary be induced to foster higher levels of investment in collective 
reputation? 
 
1. Ratings systems 
In recent years there have been a plethora of “ratings” systems, measuring various 
qualities of interest across countries and ranking them accordingly.  Examples include the 
World Competitiveness Report, Transparency International’s Corruption Reports, the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators, to name a few.  These systems have been the target 
of much critique, both methodologically and substantively.84 Nevertheless, there is some 
evidence that countries take them seriously.85
Cross-national ratings such as the World Bank’s Rule of Law Measure can induce 
the managers of the judiciary to ensure that there is sufficient investment into collective 
reputation. Because the managers ultimately work for the public, high profile ratings can 
capture public attention and lead to pressures on the managers to improve performance.  
It can also motivate the government to expend resources on the judiciary, empowering 
judges in the internal competition for funds.  It should be recognized, though, that any 
simple metric risks inducing new pathologies into the system as managers and judges try 
to game the system.  Suppose, for example, that a cross-national metric of time to 
disposition is used to rank judiciaries, just as  the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 
measures administrative procedures required to set up a firm.  This could lead to an 
emphasis on speed over quality, which might in turn hinder the overall reputation of the 
judiciary. 
   
 
2. Random De Novo Appeal 
As we have seen, systems with de novo appeal tend to have a greater emphasis on 
collective reputation than those without such appeals.  This might lead one to propose an 
expansion of de novo appeal as a way of ensuring judicial quality.  The problem is that de 
                                                 
84 For example, Larkins above 82, provides the following objections: reliance on formal indicators rather 
than reality; the appropriate information is unclear for comparative purposes; problematic interpretation of 
significance of judicial outcomes; and the arbitrary nature of many findings due to subjectivity in numerical 
scoring.  The rule of law indicator of the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, which is seen as the state of 
the art in many ways, lacks internal validity, as it purports to measure different concepts from year to year.  
See Kurtz M and Schrank A 2007 ‘Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms’ 69 The 
Journal of Politics 538. 
85 Taylor V 2006 ‘The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transition 
Economies’ in Lindsey T ed 2006 Law Reform in Developing States Routledge. 
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novo appeal is expensive, and many judiciaries that do not allow it also have a relatively 
small number of judges. 
One way to obtain the benefits of de novo appeal without incurring all the costs 
would be to use a randomization method to draw a certain number of cases into a de novo 
review.  If trial judges know that there is some chance that their fact-finding would be 
reviewed in detail, this might induce them to invest more resources into individual cases, 
which presumably would enhance the overall quality of fact-finding.  The number of de 
novo appeals could be calibrated to balance the marginal cost against the marginal 
deterrence benefit in heightened quality. We know of no system which utilizes random 
audit methods for reviewing judicial cases, but it seems an elementary innovation, with 
potential beneficial effects in countering corruption as well as producing more careful 
decisions. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Judicial reputation matters.  It provides information about performance and indirectly 
affects judicial resources and power. As of yet, however, we do not have a complete 
understanding of the determinants of reputation.  This paper has used law and economics 
tools to understand investment in reputation as a problem of team production.  Judiciaries 
require individual effort by judges, but it is difficult to observe any particular judge’s 
contribution to overall performance.  Furthermore, judges who are concerned only with 
their own reputation might undermine collective judicial reputation. On the other hand, 
too much emphasis on collective reputation might lead judges to shirk, producing lower 
quality justice. 
This framework helps us to understand the inner workings of judicial systems. We 
have identified a set of particular institutional choices, roughly but not perfectly 
corresponding to the distinction between common law and civil law systems, that provide 
the incentives structure for judges.  We believe that these institutional choices are linked 
and, in the aggregate, determine the particular texture of judicial reputation.  Crucially, 
legal systems can experience pathologies when institutional reforms skew investment 
incentives in one direction or another.   
As a normative matter, designers of judicial systems need to think about 
incentives for reputation building, which will enhance to the various outputs expected 
from the judiciary.  Our particular proposals are intended to be suggestive, but we believe 
that we have identified the right level of analysis to characterize national patterns in a 
more refined way. 
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